Modelling Lobbying Behaviour and Interdisciplinarity Dynamics in
  Academia by Mazzoleni, Stefano et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
01
00
2v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  3
 Fe
b 2
01
8
Modelling Lobbying Behaviour and Interdisciplinarity
Dynamics in Academia
Stefano Mazzoleni1+, Lucia Russo2, Francesco Giannino1, Gerardo Toraldo3,
Constantinos I. Siettos4*
1 Laboratory of Applied Ecology and System Dynamics, Dipartimento di Agraria,
University of Naples Federico II, Italy
2 Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Naples, Italy
3 Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni “Renato Caccioppoli”, University of
Naples Federico II, Italy
4 School of Applied Mathematics and Physical Sciences, National Technical University
of Athens, Greece
+stefano.mazzoleni@unina.it, *ksiet@mail.ntua.gr
Abstract
Disciplinary diversity is being recognized today as the key to establish a vibrant
academic environment with bigger potential for breakthroughs in research and
technology. However, the interaction of several factors including policies, and
behavioral attitudes put significant barriers on advancing interdisciplinarity. A
“cognitive rigidity” may rise due to reactive academic lobbying favouring inbreeding.
Here, we address, analyse and discuss a mathematical model of lobbying and
interdisciplinarity dynamics in Academia. The model consists of four coupled
non-linear Ordinary Differential Equations simulating the interaction between three
types of academic individuals and a state reflecting the rate of knowledge
advancement which is related to the level of disciplinary diversity. Our model predicts
a rich nonlinear behaviour including multiplicity of states and sustained periodic
oscillations resembling the everlasting struggle between the “new” and the “old”. The
effect of a control policy that inhibits lobbying is also studied. By appropriate
adjustment of the model parameters we approximated the jump/phase transitions in
breakthroughs in mathematical and molecular biological sciences resulted by the
increased flow of Russian scientists in the USA after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union starting in 1989, the launch of the Human Genome Project in 1992 and the
Internet diffusion starting in 2000.
Introduction 1
The challenging complex problems that we are facing today, the ones with pressing 2
important social, health and environmental impacts (such as the climate change, the 3
(re)emergence and the spread of infectious diseases and the mapping of the human 4
brain connectome) are beyond the potential of any single scientific discipline to 5
confront by itself. Their solution requires the synergy and integration of knowledge 6
and efforts from diverse scientific disciplines. Thus, the role and importance of 7
disciplinary diversity and its efficient integration is recognized today as a key to 8
unlocking the potential to achieve breakthroughs in science and technology [1–8]. 9
Recall the example of computational neuroscience, a prototype of interdisciplinary 10
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subject that was born around the early 70s fertilized by the pioneering work of Ian 11
Hodgkin and Andrew Huxley (Nobel Prize laureates in Medicine in 1963). The need 12
to understand the complexity of brain development and functioning led to the 13
integration of different traditional disciplines ranging from medicine and biology to 14
physical, social sciences, mathematics and computer science. 15
Over the last decades, interdisciplinarity has been emerged by two ways [9]: (a) 16
internally through the interaction of different disciplines themselves in the mill of 17
science (such as the case of the birth of computational neuroscience [10]), and (b) 18
externally, driven by political decisions that allocate public science funding (such as in 19
the case of the Human Genome Project). 20
Today, many Universities, government agencies and Institutions acknowledge the 21
importance to foster multi- and interdisciplinary interactions both in research and 22
teaching programs [5–8]. However, this process is neither monotonic nor easy to 23
establish. Structural, behavioural and conflict of interests, especially in funding, raise 24
significant barriers [7, 11, 12]. All in all, what is recognized as the main barrier is the 25
resistance to change [13]. These barriers establish a “cognitive rigidity’ that favors the 26
conduction of both research and teaching within the rigid boundaries of disciplines [11]. 27
Policies and practices for the allocation of research grants, recruitment, tenure and 28
promotion are some of the structural barriers hindering interdisciplinarity [7, 12, 14]. 29
This structural “rigidity” coupled with professional friendships/lobbying make 30
established/reactive practices harder to change [7]. As in any social system, people are 31
connected to others that share common and more familiar to them practices for better 32
or for worse. High rates of academic inbreeding in the same disciplines are identified in 33
many academic systems around the world making recruitment completely 34
impermeable to external candidates [15–17]. In the past, this practice was likely to be 35
beneficial in terms of fast production of research results as it fosters research team 36
cohesion and continuity and diminishes risks recruitment [15]. However, the challenges 37
of today demand openness and disciplinary diversity to innovation [6, 7]. 38
Here, we address a mechanistic dynamical model in the form of coupled nonlinear 39
ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that aspires to simulate the interplay between 40
lobbying practices and disciplinary diversity at the level of a department. 41
Our model (see Figure 1 for a conceptual scheme) contains three different types of 42
individuals: Lobbyists, Independent researchers and Neutrals. Their interactions and 43
relative dominance create the scientific-cultural environment affecting the capability of 44
the system to achieve breakthroughs in knowledge and innovation. Lobbyists mainly 45
act strongly defending their research field/discipline, thus favouring academic 46
inbreeding. Their target is to increase their academic power (rising the number of 47
researchers in their group and career advancement for the group members). Possibly 48
they may also try to create a “friendly” network between different groups, thus 49
creating “cartels” that share similar goals in relation with fund raising strategies. 50
Hence, lobbyists show a clear tendency to work more within their sectorial expertise 51
on mainstream topics rather than on new unexplored ideas. On the other hand, 52
independent researchers are individuals more interested in research questions and 53
knowledge advancement than in academic career and management. Persons belonging 54
to this category have a genuine interest and tendency to work across traditional 55
disciplinary boundaries. In fact, this attitude has been explicitly recognized as a 56
transdisciplinary orientation characterizing researchers with higher production of 57
interdisciplinary research articles [2]. Thus, lobbyists put barriers and obstacles to the 58
careers of independent researchers by influencing the recruitment process in a biased 59
way to the advantage of their own growth. However, we are not stating that it is 60
intrinsically wrong to try to favour the own group, as this can be the natural case also 61
for an independent researcher. The main difference in our perspective relies in the 62
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Figure 1. Conceptual overview of the model. Schematic representation of academic
system structure and related effects on rates of breakthrough knowledge advancement.
Black filled symbols refer to independent researchers in different fields, triangles and
open circles represent lobby and neutral individuals, respectively. In (A) the system is
characterized by high disciplinary diversity and small sized lobbies, thus maintaining
sustainable conditions for positive rates of knowledge advancement and consequent
strong stimulus to innovation. In (B) the system presents large sized lobbies and
therefore low discipline diversity, producing a negative feedback on the rate of
knowledge “jumps” and consequent reduced stimulus to breakthroughs. The transition
from B to A is only possible by an external policy control against lobbying. Greek
letters refer to model parameters see Table 1
level of hostility against the others. An independent researcher appreciates a good 63
active group, independently of its affiliation. Differently, a lobbyist perceives as a risk 64
the growth of a different group. These two opposite behaviours objectively produce 65
feedbacks on the diversity levels of the academic scenario with lobbyists and 66
independent researchers decreasing and increasing, respectively in the long term, the 67
rate of knowledge innovation. Moreover, Neutral individuals represent those 68
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researchers that do not provide strong contribution to knowledge breakthroughs, but 69
at the same time do not actively participate to lobby groups. However, these 70
individuals may change their status either joining a lobby group or becoming an 71
independent researcher. Such a decision is influenced in an analogy to the concept of 72
“cultural attractors” by two opposing factors: the “power” of lobbyists and the level of 73
attractiveness of interdisciplinarity, respectively [18, 19]. 74
We also address a fourth variable (the potential for breakthrough knowledge, BK), 75
representing the effect of the level of knowledge integration of disciplinary diversity. 76
By definition BK is enhanced by independent researchers and inhibited by lobbyists 77
because disruptive technologies and/or breakthrough concepts most likely rise from 78
cross-border interactions rather than from data accumulation within an established 79
field [6, 7]. 80
The model dynamics have been systematically studied with the aid of numerical 81
bifurcation theory to explore the solutions in the parametric space and detect the 82
critical points that mark the onset of phase changes in the academic structure and the 83
related capability of innovation. Within this context, the bifurcation diagrams were 84
constructed in the one and two dimensional parametric space with respect to the 85
external policy intensity aiming at establishing disciplinary diversity and the “power” 86
of lobbyists to recruit/inbreed neutrals. The model exhibits a complex dynamical 87
behaviour including multistability of equilibria, stable (and unstable) sustained 88
oscillations and turning points that mark the boundaries between lobbying prevalence 89
and corresponding establishment of disciplinary diversity or maintenance of a 90
disciplinary “silo” and successive feedbacks on knowledge advancement. Thus, by 91
calibration of the values of the model parameters corresponding to the rates of 92
advancement/inhibition of inderdisciplinarity, the intensity of control policy against 93
lobbying and the transition rates between neutrals and individuals, we simulated the 94
phase transitions in interdisciplinary research in biology reported from 1989 to 2000 95
due to the flow of ex-soviet scientists in the USA, the Human Genome Project and the 96
Internet diffusion. 97
Results 98
The system of ODEs Eq. (7-10) (See Materials and Methods) was analysed using the 99
tools of numerical bifurcation analysis. We analyzed the model dynamics with respect 100
to the intensity of the power of lobbyists to recruit neutrals (represented by the 101
parameter β) and the intensity of the external policy to tackle with lobbying 102
behaviour (represented by the parameter κ). The values of the other parameters are 103
µ = 0.5, λ = 0.1, γ = 0.05, ζ = 0.07, θ = 1, η = 0.05, ǫ = 0.02. 104
In the absence of control policy, i.e. for κ = 0, and for β = 0.14, the system 105
exhibits multiplicity of states. Depending on the initial conditions of the states 106
(N(0), L(0), I(0), BK(0)), two different stable equilibrium points can be reached (see 107
Figure 2A-D). Starting for example with equal densities for all three types of academic 108
behaviour and BK(0) = −4, the system converges to 109
(N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.357, 0.643, 0,−1.185). This state is characterized by a low level of 110
breakthrough knowledge capability, dominated by the lobbying behaviour and zero 111
number of independent researchers (Figure 2A,C). Setting as initial condition 112
BK(0) = −1 the system converges to a lobby-free state 113
(N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.333, 0, 0.667, 33.333) characterized by a very high level of 114
breakthrough knowledge potential and dominance of the independent researchers 115
(Figure 2B,D). 116
To systematically investigate the system’s behaviour w.r.t.β, in the absence of a 117
control policy, we constructed the bifurcation diagrams shown in Figure 2E-H. 118
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Figure 2. Model dynamics without control policy (κ = 0, β = 0.14 ). Time
evolution of the state variables. (A) BK and (C) N,L, I with initial conditions
N(0) = 0.334, L(0) = 0.333, I(0) = 0.333, BK(0) = −4, (B) BK and (D) N,L, I
with initial conditions N(0) = 0.334, L(0) = 0.333, I(0) = 0.333, BK(0) = −1.
One-dimensional bifurcation diagrams w.r.t. β. E. N , F. L, G. I, H. There are
two turning points, TP1 at β ≈ 0.058 ((N,L, I, BK) = (0.862, 0.136, 0.001,−0.284)),
and, TP2 at β ≈ 3.588 ((N,L, I, BK) = (0.028, 0.917, 0.054, 0.428)); a transcritical
bifurcation (TR) appears also at β ≈ 0.3 ((N,L, I, BK) = (0.333, 0, 0.667, 33.333)).
Solid lines correspond to stable equilbria and dashed lines to unstable equilbria.
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There are two turning points at β ≈ 0.058 ((N,L, I, BK) 119
≈ (0.862, 0.136, 0.001,−0.284)) (TP1) and at β ≈ 3.588 ((N,L, I, BK) 120
≈ (0.028, 0.917, 0.054, 0.428)) (TP2), as well as a transcritical bifurcation (TR) at 121
β ≈ 0.3 ((N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.333, 0, 0.667, 33.333)). The two turning points mark the 122
appearance and disappearance of solutions and the transcritical bifurcation marks the 123
exchange of the stability between the solution branches. Thus, for β < 0.058, the only 124
stable solution is the lobby-free state characterized by the dominance of Independent 125
researchers and therefore very high levels of potential for breakthroughs. At this 126
branch, a transcritical bifurcation (TR) appears at which the lobby-free state looses 127
its stability in favour of another branch of stable equilibria that ends up to the turning 128
point TP2. This branch is now characterized by the co-existence of all three “species” 129
and thus by relatively high levels of disciplinary diversity. For example on this branch 130
at β ≈ 0.5, (N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.2, 0.4, 0.4, 19), while at β ≈ 1.0, 131
(N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.1, 0.7, 0.2, 8.313). Beyond TP1, the solutions become unstable up to 132
the other turning point (TP1). At TP1 a branch of stable equilibria is born. This 133
branch is characterized by the absence of independent researchers (I = 0) (see Figure 134
2G) and thus low levels of potential of breakthroughs (see Figure 2H). For increasing 135
values of beta, this branch leads asymptotically to the absolute dominance of lobbyists. 136
Indeed, on this branch at β ≈ 0.125, (N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.4, 0.6, 0,−1.5), while for 137
β ≈ 0.5, (N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.9, 0.1, 0,−2.25). 138
To analyse the system’s behaviour in the presence of control policy against 139
lobbying, i.e. for κ > 0, we constructed the bifurcation diagrams w.r.t. κ. Figure 3 140
depicts the one-dimensional bifurcation diagrams for β = 0.14 (Figures 3A-D) and 141
β = 0.18 (Figures 3E-H). 142
For β = 0.14, a stable lobby-free solution (N,L, I, BK) = (0.333, 0, 0.667, 33.333) 143
exists for all values of the bifurcation parameter κ (not shown in Figure 3A-D). For 144
κ <≈ 6.147, the co-existence of all three types of academic behaviour is possible. This 145
co-existence is characterized by high densities of neutrals (around 80% of the total 146
staff, see Figure 3A), moderate densities of lobbyists (around 19% of the total staff, 147
see Figure 3B), low densities of I (around 1 % of the total staff, see Figure 3C) and a 148
relatively low/moderate potential for breakthroughs (around -0.3,see Figure 3D). At 149
κ ≈ 6.147 ((N,L, I, BK) = (0.824, 0.171, 0.005,−0.197)), the co-existence of equilibria 150
looses its stability by a subcritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation (AH) which marks the 151
onset of a branch of unstable limit cycles. This branch of unstable limit cycles 152
disappears at a homoclinic bifurcation (HB) at κ ≈ 5.475 where the unstable limit 153
cycle hits the saddle equilibrium. For κ > 6.147 the only stable solution is the 154
lobby-free one characterized by a very high level of disciplinary diversity. For even 155
higher values of κ, a turning point (TP ) appears at κ ≈ 12.1782 156
((N,L, I, BK) = (0.616, 0.367, 0.017,−0.11)), which however does not change the 157
stability of solutions; on either side of the turning point, the equilibria are saddles. 158
For β = 0.18, we get the bifurcation diagrams w.r.t. κ depicted in Figure 3E-H. 159
Now the subcritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation (AH) turns into a supercritical at 160
κ ≈ 17.55 ((N,L, I, BK) = (0.707, 0.281, 0.011,−0.137)), giving birth to a branch of 161
stable limit cycles. The stability of limit cycles is then lost through a turning point of 162
limit cycles (TPL) at κ ≈ 18.508. The branch of unstable limit cycles disappears 163
through a homoclinic bifurcation (HB) at κ ≈ 18.48 where the limit cycle hits the 164
saddle equilibrium. For κ > 18.508 the only stable solution is the lobby-free state 165
characterized by a very high level of potential for breakthroughs. For even higher 166
values of κ, a turning point (TP ) appears at κ ≈ 21.349 167
((N,L, I, BK) = (0.554, 0.426, 0.02,−0.094)) that does not change the stability of 168
equilibria as on either side these are saddles. 169
By further increasing the value of β to β = 0.2 we get the bifurcation diagram w.r.t. 170
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κ illustrated in Figure 4. The Andronov-Hopf bifurcation disappears and we end up 171
with a single saddle-node bifurcation at κ ≈ 26.344, 172
(N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.53, 0.45, 0.02,−0.088). 173
Taken all together, the above two one-dimensional bifurcation diagrams suggest the 174
existence, in the two-dimensional parameter space (κ, β), of at least one Bautin 175
(Generalized Andronov-Hopf) bifurcation marking the boundary between sub and 176
supercritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcations, and potentially, of a Takens-Bogdanov 177
bifurcation which marks the coincide of turning points with Andronov-Hopf 178
bifurcations. 179
To explore the overall system’s behaviour in the two-dimensional parameter space 180
(κ,β), we constructed the two-dimensional bifurcation diagram depicted in Figure 5. 181
We also illustrate phase portraits of a sustained oscillation within the region of 182
existence of stable limit cycles for κ = 18, β = 0.18 and initial conditions 183
N(0) = 0.729, L(0) = 0.259, I(0) = 0.012, BK(0) = −0.15. 184
As it is shown, there are two Bogdanov-Takens (BT) bifurcations, where the 185
Andronov-Hopf bifurcations coincide with the turning points, at (κ, β) ≈ 186
(0.045, 0.059), (N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.859, 0.139, 0.002,−0.253), and at (κ, β) ≈ 187
(23.006, 0.187), (N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.546, 0.434, 0.02,−0.092). There are also two Bautin 188
bifurcations (generalized Andronov-Hopf bifurcations (GH)) , which set the boundaries 189
between sub and supercritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcations at (κ, β) ≈ (10.748, 0.1639), 190
(N,L, I, d) ≈ (0.788, 0.205, 0.007,−0.173), and at (κ, β) ≈ (21.842, 0.185), 191
(N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.607, 0.376, 0.017,−0.108). On the branch of the turning points of 192
limit cycles that connects the two GH points (shown with (green) solid line), there is a 193
cusp point at (κ, β) ≈ (7.455, 0.1503). The region of stable sustained oscillations is 194
bounded between the branch of Andronov-Hopf bifurcations connecting the two BT 195
points (shown with dotted (blue) line), and the branch of turning points of branches of 196
limit cycles (shown with (green) solid line). At this point we should note that due to 197
the test function that the MATCONT uses to perform continuation of Andronov-Hopf 198
points, MATCONT reports also a branch of neutral saddles, that emerges from the 199
BT bifurcation at (κ, β) ≈ (21.842, 0.185). Neutral saddles satisfy also the test 200
function of MATCONT for Andronov-Hopf points (as at these points the sum of two 201
(non zero) real eigenvalues becomes zero), yet these points are not bifurcations. Hence, 202
we don’t show this branch in the two dimensional bifurcation diagram. 203
Discussion 204
As well known in biology and ecology, diversity is a key factor for selection processes, 205
system evolution [20] and ecosystem productivity [21]. The negative effects of excess 206
of inbreeding are well known, producing worsening of genetic diversity and 207
consequently lower competitive performance in the long term [22]. In analogy to this, 208
our model addresses a reciprocal negative feedback between the potential of knowledge 209
breakthroughs and the growth of lobbies due to the related effects on disciplinary 210
diversity. 211
An in-depth analysis of the Universities in USA [1] demonstrated that the potential 212
for scientific breakthroughs is significantly higher in relatively small and flexible 213
research structures, whereas institutions characterized by high level of organization 214
isomorphism, i.e. reduced disciplinary diversity in their research structures, show clear 215
decline of their scientific innovation performances, due to the intrinsic tendency to 216
work in established problems areas. 217
In Academia, the favoritism towards sub-standard researchers and/or relatives 218
regardless of their scientific merit, has been long recognized. For example, it has been 219
shown that nepotism results to significant negative correlation with scientific research 220
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performance [23]. Nepotism is usually referred to the action that favors members of 221
the own family regardless of their scientific merit, but here we claim that this should 222
not be strictly limited to just phylogenetic relationships. Indeed, a broader cultural 223
conception of familism/inbreeding can be described in which the “family” corresponds 224
to a scientific/cultural/behavioural category and the degree of kinship assessed by the 225
level of affiliation/similarity to the same category (lobby). 226
In Europe, several studies have revealed high levels of academic inbreeding, where 227
in some countries it reaches as much as 95% [17,24]. On the other hand, the 228
importance of intellectual and scientific diversity has been recognized in American 229
universities, which in general do not hire their own PhD students. In USA, around 230
93% of candidates to academic positions were reported as externals [25, 26]. 231
In fact it has been reported that inbreeding inhibits the entrance of new and fresh 232
ideas as research partners within the same disciplines with strong ties over long 233
periods may “naturally” be entrapped to a clique [3]. Interestingly, it has been argued 234
that the production of quality outcomes may become limited not only by the 235
individuals deficiencies, but also “by cartels of mutually satisfied mediocrities” [27]. 236
Under such conditions, best individuals of small/weak groups are out competed by 237
mediocres of strong large tribes. On the other hand, loose ties in such scientific cliques 238
may provide opportunities/potential for integration of interdisciplinary knowledge 239
from outsiders and therefore breakthroughs [3]. 240
On the other hand, interdisciplinarity has been associated with research 241
breakthroughs [1], but its quantitative and objective assessment is difficult [4]. 242
Disciplinary diversity is a necessary condition for the growth and establishment of 243
interdisciplinary research and can be inferred to some degree by ISI subject 244
categories [28]. However, disciplinary diversity is a necessary but not a sufficient 245
condition to guarantee knowledge integration leading to truly interdisciplinary 246
research; the latter rather depending on the successful interaction of “local bodies” of 247
knowledge [4]. 248
Purposely, we did not model the “size” of scientific production. Several studies 249
have shown that research quality and breakthroughs are not directly related to 250
quantitative metrics such as journal impacts, number of publications and size of 251
research teams [3, 29]. Thus, we do not claim that lobbyists and neutrals necessary 252
publish less or worse quality papers than independent researchers. Here, instead, we 253
focused on the attitude of lobbyists as an opposite force to the disciplinary diversity, 254
the necessary (yet not sufficient) condition for achieving breakthroughs in complex 255
problems with important social impact. Since academic lobbies are obstacles to the 256
advance of breakthrough knowledge, given their intrinsic resistance to dynamic 257
changes of established equilibria [30], the departments, in order to be successful in 258
producing innovative research, have to mitigate the “natural” trend of lobby 259
formation. Breaking down dominant positions, despite the expected obvious internal 260
opposition, will produce higher disciplinary diversity and by improving the cultural 261
context, reinforce the long term performance of the academic structures. Thus, aiming 262
to better scientific performances, one of the available options for policy actions is the 263
promotion and increase of investments (both on recruitment and career advancement) 264
in less represented fields. But this is not so easy to achieve. Moreover, where scientists 265
are stressed to act according to “publish or perish” orientation, in order to increase 266
the number of publications and grants, open research questions are not efficiently 267
faced [31]. 268
Building up on the above studies and conceptions, our mathematical model 269
incorporated two categories of parameters, reflecting both internal and external 270
factors. The internal factors reflect the direct and indirect interactions of individuals 271
in an academic environment, while the external factor mirrors the control policy 272
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against lobbying, thus favoring the enhancement of disciplinary diversity. The model 273
exhibits a complex dynamic behavior with multistability of states and sustained 274
oscillations due to the interactions between the composition of the academic 275
population and the cultural context related to the level of innovative thinking. These 276
results are qualitatively similar to those reported for oscillating patterning of the 277
commons in the so called coevolutionary game theory, with a coupled evolution of 278
individual strategies and the related environmental context [32]. 279
Very clear examples of real data on the above discussed dynamics have been 280
recently reported by Phillips [33]. A sudden and astonishing jump/phase transitions of 281
both the number of publications and breakthroughs in mathematical and molecular 282
biological sciences resulted by the increased flow of ex-Soviet scientists in the USA, 283
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union starting in 1989. Moreover, other similar 284
phase transitions, though to a lower extent to the above reported “Russian jump” 285
(RJ), were recorded in the period 1992–1996 with the $3 billion funding of the Human 286
Genome (HG) and, later on, in association with the Internet diffusion (ID) since 287
2000 [33]. Our model is able to qualitatively represent these observations by a simple 288
exploratory simulation exercise. (see Figure 6. 289
The RJ effect on bursting interdisciplinary research can be simulated by a sudden 290
change of system diversity due to the entrance in the academic population of many 291
new scientists with very different background. At the same time, the increase of 292
resources due to HG funding can be reflected by policy intervention captured by 293
increasing of k parameter. On the other hand, the ID discontinuity started in 2000 can 294
be obviously represented by a facilitated connection between research actors, i.e. a 295
change in λ and ζ parameters to reflect the faster exchange between neutral and 296
independent individuals. 297
So, big sudden changes/phase transitions in the academic environment can be 298
induced by external forces, i.e. control policies. In the presence of an external control 299
action against lobbying and moderate rates of influence of lobbyists, our model 300
predicts critical points beyond which lobbying disappears and there are again two 301
stable states both characterized by zero levels of lobbying behaviour. One of them is 302
characterized by the dominance of neutrals and low presence of independent 303
researchers and thus moderate levels (potential) of research breakthroughs. The other 304
one corresponds to very high levels/potential for research breakthroughs due to the 305
dominance of independent researchers. 306
It should be noted that the intensity of external action that is necessary to 307
moderate lobbying behaviour is relatively large with respect to the values of the other 308
rates. This reflects the fact that (as also reported in [7]) in order to tackle 309
conservative attitudes, a high level of awareness and effort is required. For higher 310
values of the power of influence of lobbyists, the system behaviour is enriched with 311
stable sustained oscillations in a relatively small window of the parameter space. 312
These oscillations in the presence of a control action can be interpreted as steps back 313
and forth dynamics between openness and closeness to new ideas as known to occur in 314
societies with opposite tendency induced by concurrency [34]. 315
We should note that interdisciplinary knowledge does not imply superiority over 316
disciplinary knowledge, nor that disciplinary research drives necessarily to the creation 317
of lobbies. Advance of knowledge obviously occur in well established academic 318
disciplines, however, in order to avoid decline in such positive performances, the 319
research institutions need to be open to external development and recruitment [1, 35]. 320
In our opinion, interdisciplinarity should not be regarded as an end in itself, but as a 321
carrier of qualitative jumps/phase transitions of knowledge and technological 322
advancements. The proposed model demonstrates that under-performing academic 323
systems become entrapped in autocatalytic lobby structures producing progressive 324
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reduction on the capability of knowledge advancement. On the other hand, high levels 325
of innovation are related to systems characterized by efficient interdisciplinary network 326
made probable by high levels of disciplinary diversity. Intermediate conditions can 327
create cycles of oscillatory performances, whereas poor quality can be changed only by 328
external interventions injecting individuals from different disciplines into the system, 329
thus destabilizing the natural lobby trends to increasing “cognitive” rigidity. The 330
entrance of fresh/novel ideas in a system most likely will produce jumps of scientific 331
innovation. Then, “good” science can be sustained by supporting research which is not 332
limited to established main streams. This can be achieved only by introducing 333
negative feedback on decision makers to force them away from academic inbreeding, 334
thus reinforcing disciplinary diversity. 335
Materials and Methods 336
A mean field model describing the dynamics of academic populations and related 337
scientific potential to breakthroughs is presented. Three different types of academic 338
staff individuals are identified and labeled as follows: 339
• L (Lobbyists which “defend” their own discipline and group, hindering the 340
entrance of new ideas and research and thus disciplinary diversity). 341
• I (Independent researchers, reflecting disciplinary diversity and thus potential 342
for advancing interdisciplinary research which may lead to breakthroughs). 343
• N (Neutrals who either enter into the Academia or they are already inside the 344
system and are “politically” passive in their preferences regarding the advance of 345
diversity/interdisciplinarity). 346
A fourth variable, BK, representing the level of interdisciplinarity (indicating the 347
potential of achieving) breakthroughs. In our model, this is, by definition, enhanced 348
by the presence of I and inhibited by L. Negative (positive) values of BK correspond 349
to low (high) levels of such a potential. Negative and positive values of BK could be 350
defined in relation to an average level of scientific research performance, which is set 351
to zero. Thus BK is modeled through the following equation (x˙ ≡ dx
dt
): 352
˙BK(t) = θ · I − η · L− ǫ ·BK (1)
where, θ is the rate of growth of BK per independent researcher, η is the rate of 353
decline of BK per lobbyist, and, ǫ is the fade out rate of BK in the absence of any 354
“stimulus”. 355
The model dynamics evolve according to the following rules: 356
• Individuals leave the system (getting into pension or leaving the department) 357
with a rate µ. 358
• In an analogy to the infection rate in networked epidemic models [36, 37], a 359
lobbyist may influence/“infect”/convince a neutral to become part of the lobby 360
through direct interaction/contact. This is modeled through the transmission 361
rate β ≡ p · s, where p is the per contact with a lobbyist probability that a 362
neutral will be convinced to join lobbyists, and s is the average number of 363
contacts with lobbyists per unit time. Hence, β is the average rate of contacts a 364
neutral makes with lobbyists that are sufficient to make him/her to join 365
lobbyists. Thus the mean field conversion rate of neutrals to lobbyists reads: 366
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rNL = β ·N · L. (2)
• When BK is positive, reflecting a relative high level of interdisciplinarity, thus a 367
large potential for breakthroughs, the easier is for a neutral to become an 368
independent researcher, and the easier is to moderate/neutralize the behaviour 369
of a lobbyist. 370
More specifically, neutrals become independent researchers with a rate 371
λ · pNI(BK) ·N , where pNI(BK) is the logistic function: 372
pNI(BK) =
1
1 + e−a(b·BK−c)
. (3)
Figure 7A shows pNI(BK) for a = 1.5, b = 10, c = 5. Note that there is nonzero 373
small probability for a N to behave/become as an I even for (small) negative 374
values of BK. 375
• In a similar manner, lobbyists are neutralized with a rate 376
rLN (BK) = γ · pLN(BK) · L, where pLN(BK) is the logistic function, given by: 377
pLN (BK) =
1
1 + e−a(b·BK−c)
. (4)
Figure 7B shows pLN(BK) for a = 1.5, b = 10, c = 5. Again, there is nonzero 378
small rate at which L are neutralized even for (small) negative values of BK. 379
• When BK is negative, reflecting a relative low level of interdisciplinarity/ 380
potential for breakthroughs, the easier is for an independent researcher to be 381
neutralized. 382
More specifically, independent researchers leave the system/neutralize with a 383
rate ζ · pIN (BK) · I, where pIN (BK) is the logistic function: 384
pIN(BK) = 1−
1
1 + e−a(b·BK−c)
. (5)
Figure 7C shows pIN (BK) for a = 1.5, b = 10, c = −1.5. Note, that there is a 385
nonzero small rate at which I are neutralized for small positive values of BK. 386
• At low levels of interdisciplinarity, as reflected by negative values of BK, we also 387
impose a “control policy” that exerts an external action/feedback aiming to 388
“moderate the conservative forces” i.e. to neutralize lobbying behaviour in the 389
presence of relatively low levels of interdisciplinarity. 390
Accordingly, lobbyists are neutralized with a rate κ · p′
LN
(BK) · L, where 391
p′
LN
(BK) is the logistic function: 392
p′LN(BK) = 1−
1
1 + e−a(b·BK−c)
. (6)
Hence, κ · p′
LN
(BK) is the rate at which the external policy neutralizes lobbying. 393
Its inverse can be regarded as the mean latent period, i.e. the period between 394
the application of the policy and neutralization. 395
Figure 7D shows p′
LN
(BK) for a = 1.5, b = 10, c = −1.5. Hence the external 396
control action is activated only for relatively large negative values of BK. 397
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Our choice to model the rate of transformations of the indirect interaction (i.e. the 398
transformations w.r.t. BK) by the logistic function is based not only on well 399
established biological/population dynamics theoretical concepts and experimental 400
studies. Recent social dynamics studies including experimental data have shown that 401
the logistic function models also the impact of social interconnected relationships 402
(e.g.cooperation, friendship, communication, influence, consensus formation and 403
decision making) [38, 39]. 404
In summary, based on the above assumptions, the mean field model reads: 405
N˙ = µ · (1−N) + κ · p′LN(BK) · L+ ζ · pIN (BK) · I
−λ · pNI(BK) ·N − β ·N · L+ γ · pLN(BK) · L
(7)
L˙ = −µ · L+ β ·N · L− κ · p′
LN
(BK) · L− γ · pLN(BK) · L (8)
I˙ = −µ · I + λ · pNI(BK) ·N − ζ · pIN (BK) · I (9)
˙BK(t) = θ · I − η · L− ǫ ·BK (10)
Note that if the initial conditions are chosen so that N + L+ I = 1, the above 406
system preserves mass as N˙ + L˙+ I˙ = 0. Hence Eq. (9) can be omitted for a 407
numerical analysis point of view. Computations were performed using MATCONT 408
[40]. The continuation of solutions past critical points was performed using the 409
Moore-Penrose continuation [40] and the absolute and relative error for the 410
Newton-Raphson iterations were set equal to 1.E − 06. The tolerance of test functions 411
used to detect criticalities was set equal to 1.E − 05. The computations of limit cycles 412
was performed using 20 mesh points and 4 collocation points. 413
A summary of the model parameters and variables are shown in Table 1. 414
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Table 1. Model parameters and variables.
Symbol Definition Units
N density of neutrals dimensionless
L density of lobbyists dimensionless
I density of independent researchers dimensionless
µ probability at which individuals get into pension,
and/or leaving their department
years−1
BK potential for breakthroughs in knowledge dimensionless
β average rate of contacts a neutral makes with lob-
byists that are sufficient to make him/her to join
lobbyists
contacts · years−1
ζ · pIN (BK) rate at which an independent researcher becomes
neutral; pIN (BK) is the logistic function scaling
the rate w.r.t. BK
years−1
λ · pNI(BK) rate at which a neutral becomes independent re-
searcher; pNI(BK) is the logistic function scaling
the rate w.r.t. BK
years−1
γ · pLN (BK) rate at which a lobbyist becomes neutral;
pLN(BK) is the logistic function scaling the rate
w.r.t. BK
years−1
κ · p′
LN
(BK) rate at which external policy neutralizes lobbying.
It’s inverse can be regarded as the mean latent pe-
riod, i.e. the period between the implementation
of the policy and neutralization; p′
LN
(BK) is the
logistic function scaling the rate w.r.t. BK
years−1
θ rate of growth of BK per independent researcher years−1
η rate of decline of BK per lobbyist years−1
ǫ rate of decline of BK per neutral years−1
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Figure 3. One-dimensional bifurcation diagrams w.r.t. κ for β = 0.14 (A-D)
and for β = 0.18 (E-H). Solid lines correspond to stable equilibria and dashed lines to
unstable equilibria; filled (open) circles correspond to maximum and minimum values
of stable (unstable) oscillations. In D, H the inset shows the bifurcation diagram of
the period of oscillations w.r.t to κ. For β = 0.14 there is a subcritical Andronov-Hopf
bifurcation (AH) at κ ≈ 6.147 ((N,L, I, BK) = (0.824, 0.171, 0.005,−0.197)). A stable
lobby-free solution (N,L, I, BK) = (0.333, 0, 0.667, 33.333) (not shown) also exists for
all values of κ.
For β = 0.18 there is a supercritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation (AH) at κ ≈ 17.55
((N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.707, 0.281, 0.011,−0.137)). The branch of limit cycles has a
turning point (TPL) at κ ≈ 18.508. A stable lobby-free solution
(N,L, I, BK) = (0.333, 0, 0.667, 33.333) (not shown in Figure) also exists for all values
of κ.
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Figure 4. One-dimensional bifurcation diagrams w.r.t. κ for β = 0.2. A. N ,
B. L, C. I, D. BK. There is a turning point (TP ) at κ ≈ 26.344
((N,L, I, BK) ≈ (0.53, 0.45, 0.02,−0.088)). A stable lobby-free solution
(N,L, I, BK) = (0.333, 0, 0.667, 33.333) (not shown in the figure) also exists for all
values of κ. Solid lines correspond to stable equilibria and dashed lines to unstable
equilibria.
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Figure 5. Two-dimensional bifurcation diagram w.r.t. κ and β. There are
two Bogdanov-Takens (BT) bifurcations and two Bautin (generalized Andronov-Hopf
(GH)) bifurcations. The dotted (blue) line is the branch of Andronov-Hopf
bifurcations. The branch of turning points of the limit cycles that connects the two
GH bifurcations is shown with the solid (green) line; this branch exhibits a cusp point
at (κ, β) ≈ (7.455, 0.1503). The branch of the continuation of turning points passing
through the two BT points is shown with the (black) solid line. Phase portraits of
sustained oscillations for κ = 18, β = 0.18 are also shown.
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Figure 6. Phase transitions in disciplinary publications and related breakthrough
knowledge. Dots correspond to number of interdisciplinary papers connecting
mathematics and molecular biology resulting from the flow of ex-soviets scientists in
the USA in 1990 (RJ), the raise in funding by the Human Genome Project in 1992
(HG) and internet diffusion in 2000 (ID) as reported in [33]. Solid line corresponds to
model simulations with calibrated changes of the parametric values
.
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Figure 7. Logistic functions as scaling factors to the rates of transformation w.r.t.
BK A. pNI(BK) scales the rate at which a neutral individual becomes an
independent researcher;a = 1.5, b = 10, c = −1.5). B. pLN (BK) scales the rate at
which a lobbyist becomes neutral. C. pIN (BK) scales the rate at which an
independent researcher becomes neutral (a = 1.5, b = 10, c = −1.5). D. p′
LN
(BK)
scales the rate at which a lobbyist individual becomes neutral by the implementation
of a control policy. a = 1.5, b = 10, c = −1.5.
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